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abstract
As recognized since long, consumption serving to signal social status, group membership, or
self-esteem is a socially contingent activity. The corresponding expenditures are motivated
mainly by the symbolic value they have for transmitting the signal. However, this presupposes
some form of social coordination on what are valid, approved symbols. Unlike consumption not
serving signaling purposes, the technological characteristics of the goods and services consumed
may be secondary – what counts is their socially agreed capacity to function as a symbol. The
paper discusses in detail the cognitive underpinnings of social agreement on consumption
symbols and a model of their spontaneous emergence.
_________________________
*) I owe thanks to Ori Heffetz for drawing my attention to the phenomenon of symbolic
consumption and the participants of a workshop on the meaning of consumption at Johnson
School, Cornell University, 2008 for helpful comments on an earlier draft of this paper.
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1. Introduction
In their historical growth process, modern economies have experienced dramatic changes in the
size and composition of consumer expenditures on goods and services (see Lebergott 1993).
Consumption has been transformed by rising real income, drifting relative prices, and
innovations in product technology and product quality that have increased the variety of goods
and services. Its many facets make the historical evolution of consumption a research topic that
does not easily lend itself to an encompassing explanation. One crucial facet undoubtable is the
qualitative change of consumer goods and services brought about by innovations. In his
pioneering work on product variety as a feature of modern consumption,  Paolo Saviotti has
suggested a theory of technological evolution as a major explanatory element and has provided
a powerful description of the changing product characteristics on this basis (Saviotti 1996; 2001;
Saviotti and Metcalfe 1984, Saviotti and Trickett 1992, Nguyen, Saviotti, Trommetter and
Bourgeois 2005).
However, important and appealing as the historical record of the objective, qualitative
changes is, its explanation faces the old problem that it is the result of the choices of consumers
who base their decisions not directly on technological characteristics and objective values.
Whether innovative product variations succeed or fail and, hence, whether they are added to the
existing consumption variety or not, rather depends on the consumers’ subjective perceptions
of, and preferences over, the alternatives that may also change over time. Being treated as a
“black box” in subjective value theory, much less is known on the motives of the consumers’
choices than on the technological characteristics of goods and services. It may be argued
therefore that an improved understanding of the very changes in product technology and product
variety (and the corresponding consumption expenditures) requires more elaborate hypotheses
about consumer behavior (Windrum 2005). 
In fact, as will be discussed in this paper, for a substantial part of consumption, the
technological characteristics of the goods and services even appear to be of secondary
importance for the consumers. To see why, it is necessary to dig somewhat deeper into the
question of what motivates consumers to spend their money. Consumption (spending) is
instrumental to help consumers satisfying their needs and wants. The motivation to consume
thus arises from unsatisfied needs and wants. Their satisfaction can be improved more or less
depending on the properties of the goods and services consumed. In many cases it can be
conjectured that these properties correspond to the product characteristics. Yet, there are
important exceptions. Consider the striving for social recognition and status seeking, for social
identification, or for avoiding dissonances in one’s self-perception. Where consumer
expenditures are motivated in this way, consumption is obviously a socially contingent activity.
This has been recognized since long (see Veblen 1898, Leibenstein 1950, Bourdieu 1984, Frank
1985, Moore 1994 for some significant examples). 
More specifically, the attempt to signal status, group membership, or self-esteem by
means of the consumption of certain goods and services rests on the symbolic value they have
for transmitting the signal – it is “symbolic consumption” (see the work by Heffetz 2009).  The
distinct feature here is that the use of consumption symbols presupposes some form of social
coordination on what are valid, approved symbols. In case of social identification and symbols
of group membership the convention may result in the use of rather idiosyncratic, group-
specific, discriminatory consumption good or service. In case of status seeking and signaling for
social recognition the convention may imply more widely recognizable (e.g. very expensive)
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consumption symbols. In any case, unlike consumption not motived to serve symbolic purposes,
the technological characteristics of the goods and services consumed are secondary – what
counts is their socially agreed capacity to function as a symbol. In a sense, thus, symbolic
consumption is the form of consumer behavior least dependent on technological product
characteristics. In the present paper it may therefore serve as a vantage point for emphasizing
the role of motivational factors underlying consumption and its evolution over time.
The paper proceeds as follows. Drawing on earlier work (Witt 2001), Section 2 briefly
outlines different motivations underlying consumer behavior – among them those of symbolic
consumption – and puts them in perspective with the role that technological product
characteristics can play for explaining the evolution of consumption. Section 3 turns to the
cognitive mechanisms from which a socially shared understanding of consumption symbols can
emerge. Section 4 presents a simple model of the actual coordination process by which a
symbolic convention can spontaneously emerge on the basis of a socially shared understanding
of the meaning of symbols. Section 5 highlights some implications of the model regarding the
role of commercial advertising for both the emergence of a shared understanding of symbols and
the actual collective coordination on the use of specific consumption symbols. Section 6 offers
the conclusions. 
2. What Needs Does Symbolic Consumption Serve (and Why Does This Matter Anyway)?
Consumption is a highly complex phenomenon. There is not only an enormous variety of goods
and services to choose from, but usually also a multitude of motivations consumers pursue with
their purchasing decisions. In the context of the present paper, it is useful to single out two
different classes of motives by distinguishing certain properties which goods and services must
have in order to be able to serve the different motives (for a detailed discussion see Witt 2001).
A first class of consumption motives can be traced back to innate, physiological needs.
Consumption activities directed at satisfying these needs typically show homoeostatic features,
implying relatively stable satiation patterns when consumption possibilities are sufficiently
abundant. Cases in point are the need to eat, to drink, to sleep, to maintain body temperature,
etc. 
In contrast, the second class of consumption motives arises from needs that are not
physiologically determined, but that seem to be partly innate as well. Paradigmatic examples
here are the needs for sensory arousal, for social recognition, or for consistency in one’s self-
perception. For different reasons, these needs and, hence, the motivation to consume which they
trigger can lack the homoeostatic features of the physiological needs. They therefore tend to
result in unstable satiation patterns when consumption possibilities become abundant. This can
have dramatic economic and social consequence as was highlighted for the latter two needs in
the work of, for example, Hirsch (1978) and Frank (1999).
Corresponding to the difference in the nature of the underlying needs, consumption
technology differs too. The satisfaction of physiological needs depends on the physiologically
defined intrinsic value of the products in terms of, e.g., content of calories, vitamins, minerals,
flavor, etc. This is a case in which the technological product characteristics have obvious
explanatory value for understanding consumption: it is for these intrinsic characteristics that the
goods and services are consumed. Concerning the second class of motives, this is different.
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     Symbolic consumption that serves the purpose of assuring to oneself a certain self-perception (or1
of avoiding cognitive dissonances in this respect) is likely to be influenced not only by (sub-) cultural
conventions, but also by the individual record of experience and learning. Therefore, consumption
symbols that can factually be observed often also express subjective idiosyncracies that go far beyond
the variety of (sub-) cultural standards.
Intrinsic properties of products consumed to that end can contribute to need satisfaction at best
indirectly, viz. to the extent to which they are conducive to signaling status to others or self-
esteem to oneself. What really matters instead is the capacity of goods and services to serve as
symbols for conspicuous consumption, conformist consumption, or non-conformist
consumption, and this capacity is not intrinsic to the products. It results from a spontaneous
process of tacit, social agreement among the members of a group or of society as to the
consumption of what goods or services rather than others (with similar or the same intrinsic
features) is accepted as a significant, relevant symbol. 
It is well possible that some intrinsic characteristics – e.g. visibility or natural scarcity
– increase the chances of some product to be accepted as a symbol. But the same intrinsic
characteristics may be possessed by many more goods and services than those factually serving
as accepted symbols. The argument to be elaborated further in this paper thus is that, because of
the nature of the underlying needs that are served by it, symbolic consumption is to a large part
a matter of social conventions: it is for their conventional – and to some extent arbitrary – status
that certain goods and services are consumed as symbols conducive to social identification,
status signaling, or self-esteem. The element of arbitrariness inherent to all conventions shows
up in the (sub-) cultural contingency of symbolic consumption. What is appreciated in some
(sub-) cultural contexts as a meaningful symbol does not necessarily qualify as such, or may
even be counter-productive, in other contexts. This is true for conspicuous consumption meant
to signal superior social status to other members of groups or societies, but even more so for
signaling conformism or non-conformism (identifying with, or differentiating from, a group and
its (sub-) culture). With increasing ability to spend on consumption, the tacit, social agreement
on what qualifies as adequate symbols are likely to change so that the differentiating or
conforming function of symbolic consumption is retained. This contributes further to the already
mentioned unstable satiation patterns resulting in the fact that, in terms of their income
elasticities, the corresponding goods and services qualify as luxuries. 1
The distinction between the two classes of consumption motives and of the underlying
needs not withstanding, goods and services consumed can serve needs from different classes
simultaneously. The consumption of certain food and drinks or related services – to take an
elementary example – can qualify as symbol of the kind just mentioned in addition to its
functional value for the underlying physiological need. If so, the symbolic function of the
product is influenced by, if it is not the outcome of, the formation of a tacit, social agreement
that is largely independent of the intrinsic characteristics of food and drinks. Furthermore, if
both kinds of motivation are present, income induced changes in actual spending behavior, i.e.
the income elasticities of the corresponding goods and services, tend to hinge on the need(s)
lacking homoeostatic satiation patterns – which are precisely those motivating symbolic
consumption.
Accordingly, in the longer run it may be decisive for the income elasticities of goods and
services whether or not their consumption is at least in part serving a symbolic function. To the
extent to which this is the case, the social convention establishing the value as a symbol may be
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     Both concepts, that of bounded rationality (Simon 1972) and that of social cognitive learning2
(Bandura 1986), rest on the same view of limited human cognitive resources constraining human
information processing and decision making. Yet social cognitive learning theory emphasizes the
learning dynamics and the social influences on what is learnt that tend to be neglected in the decision-
theoretic framework of the literature on bounded rationality.
more important than the intrinsic properties of the goods and services. Hence, producers of
goods and services who want to profit from the additional purchasing motivation (and a
potentially higher income elasticity) have strong incentives to undertake promotion activities
that target at influencing the process of social convention formation in a way favorable to their
products. Under what condition this can be effective will have to be discussed below. Before,
however, it is necessary to explain in more detail how the spontaneous processes work by which
tacit, social agreement emerges and on what features of human behavior they rest.
3. Symbolic Consumption and the Role of Social Cognitive Learning
In the previous section it has been argued that symbolic consumption rests on spontaneously
emerging conventions about what the goods and services are that function as symbols and what
they mean. This presupposes that the individual agents share an understanding of what the
messages conveyed by possible symbols are. Only on the basis of such a common understanding
is it possible to coordinate on which symbols to use when. The fact that a socially shared
understanding can emerge rests on a particular feature of human behavior. This feature, to be
explained now in more detail, is the dynamic correlate of bounded rationality: the capacity to
adapt by social cognitive learning.  2
As a result of the limited cognitive resources, human attention, perception, and memory
are highly selective. Furthermore, due to the fact that humans are social, communicating
animals, their cognition is not entirely independent of that of other humans. This is due to the
fact that, in groups with intense internal communication, the group members tend to tacitly
develop similarities in their cognitive frames. As a result, there are also similarities within such
groups concerning the question of where selective individual attention goes and what is
selectively perceived and memorized. These similarities include the individual selection and
understanding of possible coordination points (or “focal points”,  Sugden 1986). Indeed, this
latter condition is an important key to understand how advertising activities can affect the
spontaneous emergence of conventions in symbolic consumption. Advertising can suggest new
consumption symbols that would otherwise not have gained attention or been considered.
Relying on mass communication media it can align even large groups of agents in their tacit
understanding of such possible new symbols. 
To elaborate on the role of social cognitive learning, the interplay between attention
processes, perception, and memory needs to be explained in more detail. We can draw here on
findings from cognitive psychology (see, e.g., Anderson 2000, Chap. 3). Personal knowledge,
knowledge about the meaning and context of symbolic actions being no exception, is acquired
and modified over time through information that comes from own experience, from the
observation of what others do, and from diverse forms of communication. However, individual
information processing and, thus, knowledge acquisition are subject to significant constraints.
In human perception a number of sensory stimuli, such as visual and acoustic signals, can be
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     Put in economic terms, this implies that the attention given to stimuli coming from the3
environment is a scarce cognitive resource that has alternative uses. This insight has been interpreted to
imply an allocation problem for which a rational solution should exist (see Radner and Rothschild 1975).
As far as the attention processes of the sensory system are concerned, however, their working and the
resulting allocation of attention are not subject to deliberate choice and planning. Attention processes are
spontaneously triggered. They select by their own rules what relatively small subset of stimuli often
abundantly offered to the sensory system from the environment actually reaches the working memory.
recognized in parallel. Yet, unless more lasting attention is paid to any such signal it will
quickly escape from memory. Hence, there is a kind of filter determining what specific stimuli
or signals are processed further and what not. This filter is provided by selective attention
processes: only signals gaining attention are processed further in thinking and memorizing. 3
What signals gain attention depends on both their physically based and their meaning-
based attributes. Concerning the physically based attributes, it has been shown that the relevant
variables are frequency and relative strength or intensity of a stimulus (Helson 1964) – in the
present context the frequency of exposure to a particular signal and the sensory quality by which
it is presented (e.g., loudness or visibility). Regarding the meaning-based attributes, the attention
paid to a signal depends on whether the cognitive system can attribute a meaning to it and what
emotional value the meaning has (Anderson 2000, Chaps. 6 and 7). A meaning is identified
through tracing information from long term memory. Long term memory is the store of
individually accumulated knowledge. In order for elements of long term memory to be made
available, they have to be activated selectively through cognitive cues contained in incoming
signals. Hence, to be given a meaningful interpretation, signals must contain cues to which
information stored in long term memory can be associated. 
A particular case in point is information associated with a meaning that has emotional
connotations. Translated (in an admittedly incomplete form) into the categories of liking or
disliking of the economic model of behavior, the emotional value of an information can be
interpreted as relating to individual tastes. By extension of the previous hypotheses the
following may then be concluded. If an individual has developed a liking or disliking for some
item, incoming signals that can be related to that item have a more important meaning than those
that cannot. Hence, they, and the information they contain, attract more attention. Since the
importance attributed to some information is highly correlated with the frequency with which
that information is attended and rehearsed, such information tends to also be more prominently
represented in long term memory, i.e. personal knowledge.
It has to be noted, though, that despite its stunning capacity long term memory is far
from being perfect. Information stored in long term memory is retrieved by cognitive traces (see
Anderson 2000, chap.7). To forget a particular piece of information stored earlier in long term
memory amounts to a loss of retrieval of that information due to insufficient practicing of the
memory traces and their subsequent decay. The crucial point is that because of the limited
information processing capacity of the working memory, practicing some particular memory
traces rather than others is always at the expense of those other memory traces. Therefore, an
information that has less frequently and the less intensively been recalled in the past is likely to
be lost from long term memory, i.e. from current knowledge. Accordingly, frequency (of
practicing those traces) and intensity (of the liking/disliking of the stored information) are once
more the decisive variables, this time with regard to the probability and speed of recalling
information. 
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In view of the constraints on human perception and memory, it is not possible for the
individual consumer to know, and keep track of, all the huge variety of both goods and services
in modern economies and possible symbolic content implied by their consumption. At any point
in time consumers can only hold knowledge about fractions of the entire consumption
possibilities. What is more, as a result of the self-augmenting interplay between attention
processes, selective perception, and memory retrieval, consumers tend to specialize and develop
an increasing sophistication in certain consumer knowledge and the corresponding symbolic and
non-symbolic consumption activities in the following sense:
(i) Since attention shifts from information less frequently and less intensely recognized
towards information recognized more often and more intensely, current knowledge and tastes
shift over time to those consumption possibilities and symbols that gain more attention (shift
effect);
(ii) the perception and knowledge of some particular consumption possibilities and
symbols that continue to attract attention tend to become more refined over time, and tastes tend
to be developed for more detailed attributes of these possibilities and symbols (refinement
effect). 
A question that remains is what determines the frequency and intensity of signals that
can, or cannot, possibly gain attention. Apart from the already mentioned physically based and
meaning-based factors influencing the intensity, is this an entirely randomly determined process
or are there any systematic features? It is at this point that the role of social-cognitive learning
becomes relevant. The individual selective information processing and learning just outlined
does not take place in an entirely isolated, autonomous way. Rather, it is molded in interactive
processes with the individuals’ social environment (Bandura 1986, Chap. 2). Communication
with, and observation of, other agents are a prominent source of information, a major factor in
attracting attention, and an important instance of learning. 
This is particularly relevant for consumption activities. The more intense and lasting
communication about, and observational learning on, the consumption behavior of other
individuals in the same social environment – a group of peers, say – are, the more likely the
individuals involved experience parallel shift and refinement effects in their perception and
knowledge of consumption. They tend to develop collectively shared interpretation patterns and
a common knowledge of symbols and symbolic practices – a first step to tacit agreement on
which ones to use when. The consequence is a significantly reduced variety of symbols and
symbolic practices that is characteristic for the sub-culture of such groups. (In part, these
cognitive commonalities result from the fact that, in intensely communicating groups, the
agents’ selective information processing is occupied with much the same topics which are
processed in parallel leaving less attention for other topics. In part, collectively shared
interpretative frames emerge in an intuitive way from mutual observational learning.) 
Observational learning is also behind the formation of “social models” (Bandura 1986,
Chap. 7) of consumption standards (‘keeping up with the Johnsons’) and symbolic practices
(‘doing like the Johnsons do’) which, when commonly accepted, imply a tacit agreement on
some conventional form rather than a multitude of possible others. As a result of intense
communicating within groups, the group members focus on much the same limited set of
consumption patterns and symbolic practices. To the extent to which they are recognized as
specific to the group, they become models of behavior – often with the normative connotation
of a behavior expected to be shown by group members.
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In groups with intense internal interactions, behavior deviating from the social model –
in the present context the use of consumption symbols other than the conventional ones – will
not only be observed by the other group members. Together with its conjectured motives it is
likely to also be made an object communication and group-internal opinion formation processes.
Such a deviation means that actions not previously considered by the other group members are
brought to their attention. They observe what, in a sense, is a vicarious experiment with
uncertain outcome that saves them own efforts or costs in conducting such experiments. If the
consequences of the experiment are assessed as rewarding, the other group member are likely
to sooner or later imitate the deviating behavior. Rewards to deviating behavior can come in
different forms. In case of symbols expressing conformism, the reward can result from having
found a more convenient or less costly form of symbolic consumption to signal conformism. In
the case of status signaling conspicuous consumption, in contrast, acquiring and enjoying the
possession of something more expensive and therefore usually more scarce and harder to get
may be experienced as a reward. In the case of symbolic consumption signaling non-
conformism, to reach distinction by creating unusual or even provocative forms of consumption
may cause the desired, rewarding effect.
As a consequence of the possible deviations of some group members, social models of
symbolic consumption and the underlying socially shared tacit agreements on what the relevant
symbols are and what they mean are not necessarily stable. Vicarious experiments with symbols
are a permanent threat to the conventional basis of symbolic consumption, but they are not all
successful. In fact, the stability of conventions in symbolic consumption can be expected to
depend on the frequency of deviating behavior, on the assessment of its consequences by the
other group members, and on the openness of the group members to such experiments that may
be influenced by advertising campaigns on the part of the producers of consumption goods and
services. These conditions and the dynamics they imply require a more detailed discussion in
the next section.
4. Emergence and Decline of Conventions about Consumption Symbols
It has been claimed above that the spontaneous emergence of the social conventions in which
symbolic consumption activities are molded requires a shared understanding of the relevant
symbols and their meaning. However, for the actual establishing of conventional symbols it is
required in addition that the agents’ consumption activities do coordinate on, and keep to, the
use of these symbols. This is not automatically following from socially sharing knowledge about
the meaning of symbols.
 
In the previous section, the first prerequisite has been explained by the limitation of the
human cognitive system that results in its high selectivity and by the social embeddedness of
selective learning processes. Even though the tacit agreement on symbolic consumption that can
spontaneously emerge within groups with intense internal communication is likely to shape the
perception of what choices to make in what situation, there may be behavior that more or less
deliberately deviates from the conventional use of symbols. This confronts the other group
members with alternatives not previously considered so that they now face a choice of whether
or not to imitate the deviation. This choice directly affects the second precondition for the
emergence of conventions in symbolic consumption: the coordination on symbolic action in
terms of the actual spending behavior. A simple model can help to clarify what the implications
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     This means that the model to be discussed represents a variant of the band-wagon effect already4
described by Veblen (1899). This effect belongs, in turn, to the class of frequency-dependency effects
which lend themselves to a particularly simple analysis when a bi-modal case can be assumed as in the
choice between sticking to an established convention or choosing a new one. The model presupposes that
a group of consumers can be defined who communicate with one another in a sufficiently intense form
to make social-cognitive learning possible. 
are for the stability of the conventional basis of symbolic consumption. To keep things simple
we will confine us here to  the case of consumption symbols expressing conformism. 4
As all conventions, those determining what symbol to use in what situation draw their
strength from the fact that the message implied by symbolic consumption (in this case to use the
group symbols to demonstrate identification with the group) is the more easily and the less
ambiguously conveyed the more widely the convention is used in corresponding consumption
activities of a group or of society. Let us therefore denote the fraction of group members who
at some time t try a deviation from the hitherto conventional symbolic consumption activities by
F(t), 0 # F(t) # 1. (The share of group members sticking to the original symbols is then given 1 -
F(t)). Assume that initially F(t) = 0, until somebody in the group deviates from that convention
and that this happens for some good reason. The deviation is likely to attracts the attention of the
other group members who become aware of a new action possibility and engage in an
interactive opinion formation process in which they try to assess the motives and outcomes of
the deviation. They then have to choose whether or not to imitate the deviation. 
Let p(t) be the probability that at time t another group member imitates the deviation,
because she assesses the consequences of deviating as sufficiently rewarding to compensate the
likely ambiguity arising from using unconventional consumption symbols. p(t) thus reflects an
assessment of motives and outcome of the vicarious experiment. Several factors play a role for
this assessment. First, the ambiguity resulting from using symbols other than the hitherto valid
ones always curtails the potential reward of deviators. However, since the ambiguity is rapidly
decreasing with a rising fraction of deviators (i.e. with a rising value of F(t)), it can be stated:
Assumption 1 The probability p(t) that at time t a group member imitates the deviation
increases more than proportionately with increasing F(t). 
Second, the assessment is heavily dependent on how the possible benefits from
deviating, i.e. from changing to other consumption symbols, are perceived. As explained in the
previous section, this in turn, hinges on the group members’ current state of likings and
knowledge. Established forms of symbolic consumption are likely to be the result of some kind
of specialization in consumption by the group members that has already taken place. Deviations
in the direction of further refinements of consumption may therefore meet less, but still enough,
reservations than shifts to consuming different goods and services for which different
consumption knowledge would have to be acquired and learned likings would have to be
devaluated. However, such reservations and the natural conservatism that conformist symbolic
consumption implies can be overcome by in opinion formation processes provided suitable
information is powerfully put on the group’s agenda. This does not necessarily have to come
from inside the group (e.g. by opinion leaders). Indeed, the fact that the group’s agenda can be
influenced from outside the group draws attention to a third factor, the role of the media in
influencing the beliefs and likings of the group members.
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Assumption 2 Conservatism partly due to earlier specialization in consumption can drive the
probability p(t) to zero unless, in the opinion formation process of the group,
attention can be directed at information suitably propagating the deviation.
The effect postulated by assumption 2 can be captured in the model by two elements.
One is a properly calibrated bias factor 1 + b(t) that lowers or raises p(t). The other element is
the variable b(t) in the bias factor. It will be made dependent here on the cumulative effort x(t)
$ 0 that is put into placing favorable information on the group agenda and a measure 8, 0 # 8
# 1, for the efficacy of that information as follows:
(1) b(t) = 1 - 2  .(1 - 8 x (t))
 
According to eq. (1), b(t) goes from - 1 to + 1 if x(t) is sufficiently raised, provided  8 > 0.
Hence, with insufficient effort (sufficient effort) to place favorable information and/or with
insufficient efficacy (insufficient efficacy) of the placed information – a bias contra (pro)
changing to new forms of symbolic consumption is assumed. If assumption 1 is accounted for
by means of a simple quadratic specification of the dependence of q(t) on F(t), taken together
with assumption 2 it results in
(2) p(t)  =  (1 + b(t)) [F(t)]  . 2
Turning now to a group member who has tried the deviation, the experienced outcome
may support the experiment undertaken or induce a switching back to the original convention.
Let the probability for a deviator to switch back at time t be given by q(t). Analogously to
discussion of the factors that influence p(t), it can be argued that 
Assumption 3 q(t) increases more than proportionately with an increasing value of 1-F(t) and
is inversely affected by the variable b(t), i.e. subject to a bias factor 1 - b(t).
Hence, when a quadratic specification is chosen again, 
(3) q(t)  = (1 - b(t)) [(1-F(t))]  .2
The dynamics of the convention underlying symbolic consumption in the case of
conformist symbols is captured by the change over time of the fraction of group members who
deviate from the hitherto conventional symbols. In discrete time this can be expressed by the
first order difference equation
       : 0    for F(t) < 0,
(4) F(t+1) =     ; F(t)  + (1-F(t)) p(t) (1+b(t)) - F(t) q(t) (1-b(t))       for F 0 [0, 1],
          < 1    for F(t) > 1.
 
After inserting eqs. (2) and (3) into (4) and some rearranging we get the cubic equation
(5) F(t+1)  = b(t) F(t)  +  (3-b(t)) [F(t)]   - 2 [F(t)] 2 3
and can state
10
 #0815 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
     Note that the first order difference eq. (5) and the corresponding graphs in Figure 1 represent5
mean processes. In the realization of the stochastic switching process based on the probabilities p(t) and
q(t) the actual increment ªF(t)/ªt  fluctuates around the expected one given by (5). Consequently, the
closer F/ approaches 0, the greater the chance that by a cumulation of random fluctuations F(t) is pushed
beyond F/ and the process then is attracted to F** = 1. For a detailed discussion of the relationship
between stochastic realizations and the mean process see Weidlich (2000).
Proposition Given assumptions 1 - 3 and the corresponding specifications in eqs. (1) - (3) the
attractors of eq. (5) bifurcate when b(t) grows from  - 1 to +1. At the same time
F(t) goes from 0 to 1. 
Since the bifurcation is a well known feature of first-order cubic difference equations (see e.g.
Lorenz 1993, Chap. 3), a proof of the proposition can be omitted here. Instead, the bifurcation
is graphically displayed in Figure 1. 
The role of the bias variable b(t) in triggering the bifurcation is as follows. For b(t) = -
1 the attractor F* = 0 is globally stable. If x(t) is raised and for given 8 so that b(t) grows,
another attractor occurs in F** = 1. The bifurcation implies changing basins of attraction of F*
and F** as b(t) grows further. If two locally stable attractors exist simultaneously in the interval
[0,1], their respective basin of attraction is separated by an unstable fixed point F/. As can be
(1)seen from Figure 1, for b(t) = - 1, F/  = 1; the entire interval [0, 1] is the basin of attraction for
(2)F*. Upon further growth of x(t) and b(t) F/ moves down the 45 -degree line into F/  and furthero
(3)on into F/ . For b(t) = 1, F/ converges to 0. The attractor F* vanishes and eventually gives way
to a globally stable attractor F** with [0,1] as the entire basin of attraction. 5
------------------------------------------
Figure 1 about here
------------------------------------------
Figure 1 Bifurcation of Attractors in the Transition Between Conventions about Symbols
The above Proposition has two implications that are important for understanding the
influence that the particularities of symbolic consumption have on the evolution of consumption
more broadly. First, since the technological characteristics of the corresponding products are
secondary in importance, goods and services incorporating technological innovations that
improve those characteristics do not necessarily enjoy a greater probability of being adopted as
the valid symbol in the collective convention formation process. Nor are they necessarily more
likely to replace existing consumption symbols that are technically inferior unless their
superiority causes the bias parameter to increase. To the extent to which consumption serves
symbolic purposes, the technological evolution in the product space therefore has only an
indirect, if any, effect on changes in consumption behavior. Second, any effort to overcome the
natural conservatism in learned consumption behavior by placing information that is favorable
for deviating from received forms of symbolic consumption must be able to attract massive
attention in order to be able to drive up the bias parameter and thus make a transition to a
convention on a new symbols possible. The efforts may be undertaken either from inside the
group or from outside. Those coming from outside may be considered the more interesting and
will therefore be paid closer attention to in the next section. 
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5. Advertising, Agenda Effects and Symbolic Consumption
The selective attention processes that have been argued above to play a key role in the
emergence of socially shared similarities in perception, tastes, and knowledge tend to
discriminate against entirely novel information. They thus stabilize and preserve the cognitive
prerequisites for the common understanding of what consumption symbols mean. Individual
perceptions, tastes, and knowledge may become refined over time, and these refinements may
be socially shared in a group. (In fact, larger groups may increasingly differentiate into sub-
groups by different, selective refinement in consumption.) However, this does not change the
conservative tendency of the processes. 
Something similar holds for the collective coordination process that results in a tacit
agreement (a convention) about what symbols to consume under what conditions. As the model
of conformist symbolic consumption in the previous section showed, hitherto conventional
symbols tend to resist attempts to deviate and to shift to new symbols, simply because there
either exists no stable attractor F** representing collective coordination on alternative symbols
or, if it exists, because it is almost certain that no spontaneous transition to F** passing beyond
the critical fraction of deviators F/ will occur. Any deviation experiment that occurs and that
may temporarily find a few imitators is almost surely given up sooner or later so that F(t) returns
to 0. (As was explained, the only exception is a massive and effective placement of information
on advantages of the new consumption symbols that could drive the bias variable from - 1 to
+1.)
The question then is what these conservative tendencies imply for the influence that
possible commercial promotional activities and advertising by producers can have on symbolic
consumption. Under what condition, if at all, do they affect either what goods and services are
used as symbols or the volume of expenditures on certain forms of symbolic consumption? In
the light of the discussion of the consumers’ cognitive capacity, for a manipulation of symbolic
consumption activities to work it would be necessary that the corresponding advertised
information is intense and frequent enough to be noted by the consumers against a background
of a huge amount of other information competing for individual attention. This is not easy to
achieve. If it would appear to be possible to manipulate consumers spending behavior, this
would most likely elicit all sorts of endeavors to do so – with the outcome of a competitive race
for the consumers’ attention. In this competition, the impact each single advertisement can have
on the consumers’ attention allocation would, however, be eroded. 
Once a competitive race is started, the effect of each single, costly advertised piece of
information on average tends to be marginalized (the possibility that a few of them gain more
attention not being excluded). Yet, not emitting information at all while the competitors do
means to lose even the average marginal attention. Under such conditions a huge amount of
competing advertisement is likely to be elicited with the effect that a direct manipulation of the
information factually processed by the consumers is unlikely to happen. Yet, there may be
indirect effects amounting to a kind of unplanned, collectively achieved manipulation of the
consumers’ perceptions. While it may be difficult to gain attention for information relating to
the specific products of a particular advertising producer, the advertisement of a whole industry
may jointly contribute to the emergence and stabilization of certain consumption symbols. 
If, for instance, the industry’s advertisements equally appeal to status recognition as a
prominent features, this may foster awareness of social status considerations and receptiveness
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to status signals among the consumers on which the industry’s advertisement is targeted. Hence,
to give an example, it is not necessarily a particular brand of cars whose consumption is
advertised as a symbol of belonging to a certain status group that attracts increasing attention
and expenditure shares. Rather it can be status seeking as such and its association with
consumption as a proper way of symbolizing status that gains in importance relative to other to
other needs that figure less prominently because there is less collective advertisement in their
favor by other industries or no commercial advertisement at all.
Indeed, for the discussed deviation from conventional symbolic consumption to succeed,
the unintended joint effect of individual advertizing activities which happen to coincide in
emphasizing symbols that stand for the same need may be decisive. In terms of the model above,
what may not be feasible for a single producer’s advertising campaign may be achieved by the
unplanned joint effect of a whole industry’s campaign: the efficacy  8  and/or the cumulative
effort x(t) of placing information may be driven to levels so that the bias variable b(t)
approaches +1 and a groups’ conservatism in symbolic consumption is overcome. If so, this
finding would not support the hypothesis of a direct manipulation of consumer behavior,
including symbolic consumption, by the producers’ advertising. But the conjecture that
advertising does have an effect on consumption would not be invalidated either. The slightly
more complex explanation would be that the effect occurs where advertising resembles the
provision of a public good that is not even intentionally produced.
6. Conclusions
In this paper the case of symbolic consumption has been discussed to demonstrate the relevance
of understanding the motivational underpinnings of consumption decisions for explaining
consumer behavior. Symbolic consumption is an important medium for expressing messages.
In this respect, the motivation underlying the corresponding spending behavior differs from that
underlying non-symbolic consumption in a significant way. The motivation is at least in part to
gain recognition by the kind of consumption chosen, be it status recognition, recognition of
belonging to, or being different from, targeted groups, or recognition of one’s self-perception.
Unlike other consumption, in all these cases symbolic consumption presupposes valid, approved
symbols to serve its purpose. The actual technological characteristics of consumer products
serving as symbols have therefore been claimed to be of secondary importance. What matters
instead is whether a social convention exists as to what goods and services function as symbols
and what they mean. 
Furthermore, it has been claimed that for the spontaneous emergence of the convention
two logically distinct (though factually often coinciding) conditions must be met. First, there
must be some common understanding among the involved individuals as to what the message
of symbolic consumption is. Second, on the basis of this common understanding, the individuals
then have to coordinate on which symbols to use when. The first of the two conditions, the
emergence of a shared understanding, has been shown to rest on a particular feature of human
behavior. This feature is the capacity of a socially embedded cognitive learning, the dynamic
correlate of bounded rationality. The second of the two conditions is contingent on a feature that
all conventions share. Their strength depends on how widely the convention is approved in the
actual interaction, in this case the signaling by means of symbolic consumption. It is precisely
in this point that the tacit agreements on symbolic consumption that are spontaneously emerging
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within groups with intense internal communication can be challenged. If behavior deviating in
the use of symbols occurs, the other group members are confronted with not previously
recognized alternatives in symbolic consumption and with the choice of whether or not to
imitate the deviation. This choice directly affects the stability of the existing conventional basis
of symbolic consumption.  
By a simple model of communication processes and agenda effects the stability
conditions have been explored in more detail. As it turned out, the analyzed processes tend to
conserve existing conventions so that conventional symbols, once they are established, tend to
resist attempt to deviate and shifts to new symbols. These findings have suggested to ask what
influence advertising can have on symbolic consumption. The tentative answer which the paper
suggests is that there is little theoretical support for the hypothesis of a direct influence of some
producer’s advertising campaign on symbolic consumption.  However, the conjecture that
advertising does have an effect on consumption is not invalidated either. The slightly more
complex explanation offered is that advertising develops an effect as the unplanned consequence
of a competitive advertising race of an entire industry that, by the symbols propagated, happens
to jointly emphasize the same need.
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Figure 1:       Bifurcation of Attractors in the Transition Between Conventions about Symbols
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